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Author: Pantano, Juan
Resulting in 9 citations.
1. Fu, Chao
Pantano, Juan
Parental Reputation and School Performance
Presented: New Orleans LA, Population Association of America Annual Meeting, April 2013
Cohort(s): Children of the NLSY79
Publisher: Population Association of America
Keyword(s): Academic Development; Achievement; Birth Order; Child School Survey 1994-1995; Discipline; Parent Supervision/Monitoring; Parent-Child Interaction; Parental Influences; Parental Investments; Parenting Skills/Styles; Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT- Math); Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT- Reading); Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT); School Progress; Schooling; Television Viewing

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

It is possible to model parent-child interactions with the tools of game theory. However, empirical work that takes these game-theoretic models to the data is in its infancy. We formulate and estimate a reputation game between a parent, who threatens punishment upon bad school performance, and her children who choose costly study effort to reduce their punishment chances. Parents have incentives to build reputations of severity and while children don't know parental type, they try to infer it by observing the history of play within the family. For given structural parameters, the game between a parent and her children is solved by backwards recursion. The solution to the game is embedded in an estimation routine that leverages longitudinal microdata from U.S. households, featuring histories of grades and punishments for each sibling. We use the estimated model to investigate the role parenting plays in determining the school performance of children.

The Data. We use longitudinal data from the NLSY-C. We observe histories of play across households. In particular, we observe measures of school performance and eventual punishments for each sibling within these households over time. We also have measure of ability for each child. This allows us to control for what is to be expected from each them in terms of school performance.

Bibliography Citation
Fu, Chao and Juan Pantano. "Parental Reputation and School Performance." Presented: New Orleans LA, Population Association of America Annual Meeting, April 2013.
2. Hao, Lingxin
Hotz, V. Joseph
Jin, Ginger Zhe
Pantano, Juan
Parental Learning and Teenagers' Risky Behavior
Presented: Detroit, MI, Population Association of America Meetings, April-May 2009
Cohort(s): NLSY79, NLSY79 Young Adult
Publisher: Population Association of America
Keyword(s): Adolescent Behavior; Alcohol Use; Drug Use; Parenting Skills/Styles; Peers/Peer influence/Peer relations; Risk-Taking; Smoking (see Cigarette Use)

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

It is well documented that teenagers engage in risky behaviors at high rates. Usually these behaviors occur without parental consent and teens invest resources to preclude parents from knowing whether and to what extent they engage in such behaviors. This may give rise to parental incentives to learn about their children by paying close attention to observable "signals" of the underlying risky behavior. Moreover, parents can set up parenting rules which are contingent upon the realization of these signals in an effort to control the behavior of their children. We explore a game theoretic model of parent-child interactions and propose an empirical strategy to identify the equilibrium reaction functions that determine teenagers' risky behavior and parenting rules. In preliminary work, we estimate approximations to these reaction functions using data on teens' risky behavior and stringency of parental rules from the National Longitudinal Survey - Young Adults (NLS-YA).
Bibliography Citation
Hao, Lingxin, V. Joseph Hotz, Ginger Zhe Jin and Juan Pantano. "Parental Learning and Teenagers' Risky Behavior." Presented: Detroit, MI, Population Association of America Meetings, April-May 2009.
3. Hotz, V. Joseph
Pantano, Juan
Parenting, Birth Order and School Achievement (Revised as Strategic Parenting, Birth Order and School Achievement , February 2011).
Presented: New Orleans, LA, Population Association of America (PAA) 2008 Annual Meeting, April 17-19, 2008
Cohort(s): Children of the NLSY79
Publisher: Population Association of America
Keyword(s): Academic Development; Achievement; Birth Order; Discipline; School Progress; Schooling; Television Viewing

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

Interest on the effects of birth order on human capital accumulation has recently re-emerged. The debate about its existence seems to be settled, but identification of the main mechanisms remains somewhat elusive. While the latest research aims at rediscovering dilution theory, we advance complementary economic hypothesis regarding the causal mechanism underlying birth order effects in education. In particular, we entertain theories of differential discipline in which those who are born later face more lenient disciplinary environments. In such context, the later born will be likely to exert lower school effort, thus reaching lower achievement levels. We provide robust empirical evidence on substantial attenuation of TV viewing restrictions for those with higher birth order (born later). We speculate this may arise a) as a result of parental reputation dynamics and/or b) because of the changing relative cost of alternative punishment technologies available to parents.
Bibliography Citation
Hotz, V. Joseph and Juan Pantano. "Parenting, Birth Order and School Achievement (Revised as Strategic Parenting, Birth Order and School Achievement , February 2011)." Presented: New Orleans, LA, Population Association of America (PAA) 2008 Annual Meeting, April 17-19, 2008.
4. Hotz, V. Joseph
Pantano, Juan
Strategic Parenting, Birth Order and School Performance
NBER Working Paper No. 19542, National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2013 (Revised Jan 2015).
Also: IZA Discussion Paper No. 7680. Forthcoming in Journal of Population Economics.
Cohort(s): Children of the NLSY79
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Keyword(s): Academic Development; Achievement; Birth Order; Child School Survey 1994-1995; Child Self-Administered Supplement (CSAS); Discipline; Family Size; Modeling, Fixed Effects; Parent Supervision/Monitoring; Parent-Child Interaction; Parental Influences; Parental Investments; Parenting Skills/Styles; Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT- Math); Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT- Reading); Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT); School Progress; Schooling; Siblings; Television Viewing

Fueled by new evidence, there has been renewed interest about the effects of birth order on human capital accumulation. The underlying causal mechanisms for such effects remain unsettled. We consider a model in which parents impose more stringent disciplinary environments in response to their earlier-born children�s poor performance in school in order to deter such outcomes for their later-born offspring. We provide robust empirical evidence that school performance of children in the NLSY-C declines with birth order as does the stringency of their parents' disciplinary restrictions. And, when asked how they will respond if a child brought home bad grades, parents state that they would be less likely to punish their later-born children. Taken together, these patterns are consistent with a reputation model of strategic parenting.
Bibliography Citation
Hotz, V. Joseph and Juan Pantano. "Strategic Parenting, Birth Order and School Performance." NBER Working Paper No. 19542, National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2013 (Revised Jan 2015).
5. Hotz, V. Joseph
Pantano, Juan
Strategic Parenting, Birth Order, and School Performance
Journal of Population Economics 28,4 (October 2015): 911-936.
Also: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00148-015-0542-3
Cohort(s): Children of the NLSY79
Publisher: Springer
Keyword(s): Academic Development; Achievement; Birth Order; Child School Survey 1994-1995; Child Self-Administered Supplement (CSAS); Discipline; Family Size; Parent Supervision/Monitoring; Parent-Child Interaction; Parental Influences; Parental Investments; Parenting Skills/Styles; Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT- Math); Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT- Reading); Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT); School Progress; Schooling; Television Viewing

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

Fueled by new evidence, there has been renewed interest about the effects of birth order on human capital accumulation. The underlying causal mechanisms for such effects remain unsettled. We consider a model in which parents impose more stringent disciplinary environments in response to their earlier-born children's poor performance in school in order to deter such outcomes for their later-born offspring. We provide robust empirical evidence that school performance of children in the National Longitudinal Study Children (NLSY-C) declines with birth order as does the stringency of their parents' disciplinary restrictions. When asked how they will respond if a child brought home bad grades, parents state that they would be less likely to punish their later-born children. Taken together, these patterns are consistent with a reputation model of strategic parenting.
Bibliography Citation
Hotz, V. Joseph and Juan Pantano. "Strategic Parenting, Birth Order, and School Performance." Journal of Population Economics 28,4 (October 2015): 911-936.
6. Norberg, Karen
Pantano, Juan
Cesarean Sections and Subsequent Fertility
Working Paper, Washington University in St. Louis, January 2013
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Washington University
Keyword(s): Birth Outcomes; Birth Rate; Births, Repeat / Spacing; Demographic and Health Surveys; Fertility; National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG); Pregnancy and Pregnancy Outcomes

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

Cesarean sections are rising all over the world and may, in some countries, soon become the most common delivery mode. A growing body of medical literature documents a robust fact: women undergoing cesarean sections end up having less children. While this medical literature conjectures that this is mostly due to a physiological channel, we adopt a more economic approach to guide our empirical examination of the link between c-sections and subsequent fertility. Exploiting several data sources and adopting a variety of empirical strategies we show that in addition to plausible biological constraints, maternal choices after a cesarean seem to be playing an important role in shaping the negative association between c-sections and subsequent fertility.
Bibliography Citation
Norberg, Karen and Juan Pantano. "Cesarean Sections and Subsequent Fertility." Working Paper, Washington University in St. Louis, January 2013.
7. Norberg, Karen
Pantano, Juan
Cesarean Sections and Subsequent Fertility
Journal of Population Economics 29,1 (January 2016): 5-37.
Also: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00148-015-0567-7
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Springer
Keyword(s): Contraception; Demographic and Health Surveys; Fertility; National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG); Pregnancy and Pregnancy Outcomes

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

Cesarean sections are rising all over the world and may, in some countries, soon become the most common delivery mode. A growing body of medical literature documents a robust fact: women undergoing cesarean sections end up having less children. Unlike most of the medical literature, which assumes that this association is mostly working through a physiological channel, we investigate a possible channel linking c-section and subsequent fertility through differences in maternal behavior after a c-section. Using several national and cross-national demographic data sources, we find evidence that maternal choice is playing an important role in shaping the negative association between cesarean section and subsequent fertility. In particular, we show that women are more likely to engage in active contraception after a cesarean delivery and conclude that intentional avoidance of subsequent pregnancies after a c-section seems to be responsible for part of the negative association between c-sections and subsequent fertility.
Bibliography Citation
Norberg, Karen and Juan Pantano. "Cesarean Sections and Subsequent Fertility." Journal of Population Economics 29,1 (January 2016): 5-37.
8. Pantano, Juan
Essays in Applied Microeconomics
Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, UCLA, 2008.
Also: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223028.pdf
Cohort(s): Children of the NLSY79
Publisher: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses (PQDT)
Keyword(s): Academic Development; Achievement; Birth Order; Discipline; Educational Attainment; Parent-Child Interaction; Parenting Skills/Styles; School Performance; Television Viewing

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

This dissertation contains three essays that apply techniques in applied microeconomics to solve scientific puzzles and questions closely related to practical policy issues. The first essay explores the impact of early access to the birth control pill on the future crime rates of the children who are born to mothers who take advantage of this unprecedented improvement in contraceptive technology. The second essay investigates whether changing parenting strategies associated with parental reputation dynamics generate birth order effects in school performance. The last essay develops and estimates a dynamic model of human capital accumulation and criminal behavior. The estimated model is used to evaluate alternative criminal records policies and to shed light on the causal relationship between education and crime.

CHAPTER 2: Strategic Parenting, Birth Order and School Performance. Interest on the effects of birth order on human capital accumulation has recently reemerged. The debate about its existence seems to be settled, but identification of the main mechanisms remains somewhat elusive. While the latest research aims at rediscovering dilution theory, we advance complementary economic hypotheses regarding the causal mechanisms underlying birth order effects in education. In particular, we entertain theories of differential discipline in which those who are born later face more lenient disciplinary environments. In such contexts, the later born sibling will be likely to exert lower school effort, thus reaching lower performance levels. We provide robust empirical evidence on substantial attenuation parental restrictions for those with higher birth order (born later). We speculate this may arise a) as a result of parental reputation dynamics and/or b) because of the changing relative cost of alternative monitoring and punishment technologies available to parents as well as increasing enforcing costs that must be afforded when multiple children must be monitored at the same time.

Bibliography Citation
Pantano, Juan. Essays in Applied Microeconomics. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, UCLA, 2008..
9. Pantano, Juan
Parental Reputation
Presented: University of Chicago, Family Economics and Human Capital (FINET) Conference, November 2012
Cohort(s): Children of the NLSY79
Publisher: University of Chicago
Keyword(s): Academic Development; Birth Order; Child Self-Administered Supplement (CSAS); Discipline; Educational Attainment; Parent Supervision/Monitoring; Parent-Child Interaction; Parenting Skills/Styles; School Performance; Television Viewing

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

Pantano’s model involves two types of parents—those that are naturally tough, and those that are lenient but may wish to mimic tough types to discourage bad behavior. But although these parents are rewarded for toughness through their child’s school performance, they receive direct disutility from punishing their children. The children, on the other hand, receive some utility from their outcomes, but disutility from putting in effort—they also, naturally, dislike being punished. If a parent punishes children when low outcomes are seen, they develop a reputation for toughness, that carries over to future children, and is anticipated when these children choose how much effort to put in. This “reputation bonus” to punishment decreases from first-born to last-born. Therefore, the model predicts that punishment for the same level of underperformance should decline with birth order; and Pantano shows this effect is seen empirically in data from the NLSY. This model presents the possibility that some portion of birth-order effects may be due to the declining need with each subsequent child for parents to establish a reputation for toughness, relative to the cost of punishing children. By decreasing the cost of punishing bad behavior or increasing the ability to monitor a child’s effort, it may be possible to reduce this component of the birth order effect.
Bibliography Citation
Pantano, Juan. "Parental Reputation." Presented: University of Chicago, Family Economics and Human Capital (FINET) Conference, November 2012.