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Author: Fu, Chao

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1.	Fu, Chao
1.	Equilibrium Tuition, Applications, Admissions and Enrollment in the College Market Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 2010. Also: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/153/ Cohort(s): NLSY97 Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Keyword(s): College Cost; College Enrollment; Colleges Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher. I develop and structurally estimate an equilibrium model of the college market. Students, who are heterogeneous in both abilities and preferences, make college application decisions, subject to uncertainty and application costs. Colleges observe only noisy measures of student ability and set up tuition and admissions policies to compete for more able students. The model incorporates tuition, applications, admissions and enrollment as the joint outcome from a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. I estimate the structural parameters of the model using the NLSY 97 data, via a three-step estimation procedure to deal with potential multiple equilibria.
	Bibliography Citation Fu, Chao. Equilibrium Tuition, Applications, Admissions and Enrollment in the College Market. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 2010..

2.	Fu, Chao
2.	Equilibrium Tuition, Applications, Admissions, and Enrollment in the College Market Journal of Political Economy 122,2 (April 2014): 225-281. Also: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/675503 Cohort(s): NLSY97 Publisher: University of Chicago Press Keyword(s): College Characteristics; College Cost; College Enrollment; Test Scores/Test theory/IRT I develop and estimate a structural equilibrium model of the college market. Students, having heterogeneous abilities and preferences, make application decisions subject to uncertainty and application costs. Colleges, observing noisy measures of student ability, choose tuition and admissions policies to compete for better students. Tuition, applications, admissions, and enrollment are joint equilibrium outcomes. I estimate the model using the NLSY97 via a three-step procedure to deal with potential multiple equilibria. I use the model to examine the extent to which college enrollment can be increased by expanding college supply and to assess the importance of various measures of student ability.
	Bibliography Citation Fu, Chao. "Equilibrium Tuition, Applications, Admissions, and Enrollment in the College Market." Journal of Political Economy 122,2 (April 2014): 225-281.

3.	Fu, Chao Pantano, Juan
3.	Parental Reputation and School Performance Presented: New Orleans LA, Population Association of America Annual Meeting, April 2013 Cohort(s): Children of the NLSY79 Publisher: Population Association of America Keyword(s): Academic Development; Achievement; Birth Order; Child School Survey 1994-1995; Discipline; Parent Supervision/Monitoring; Parent-Child Interaction; Parental Influences; Parental Investments; Parenting Skills/Styles; Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT- Math); Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT- Reading); Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT); School Progress; Schooling; Television Viewing Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher. It is possible to model parent-child interactions with the tools of game theory. However, empirical work that takes these game-theoretic models to the data is in its infancy. We formulate and estimate a reputation game between a parent, who threatens punishment upon bad school performance, and her children who choose costly study effort to reduce their punishment chances. Parents have incentives to build reputations of severity and while children don't know parental type, they try to infer it by observing the history of play within the family. For given structural parameters, the game between a parent and her children is solved by backwards recursion. The solution to the game is embedded in an estimation routine that leverages longitudinal microdata from U.S. households, featuring histories of grades and punishments for each sibling. We use the estimated model to investigate the role parenting plays in determining the school performance of children. The Data. We use longitudinal data from the NLSY-C. We observe histories of play across households. In particular, we observe measures of school performance and eventual punishments for each sibling within these households over time. We also have measure of ability for each child. This allows us to control for what is to be expected from each them in terms of school performance.
	Bibliography Citation Fu, Chao and Juan Pantano. "Parental Reputation and School Performance." Presented: New Orleans LA, Population Association of America Annual Meeting, April 2013.

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