Search Results

Author: Seitz, Shannon
Resulting in 5 citations.
1. Beauchamp, Andrew
Sanzenbacher, Geoffrey
Seitz, Shannon
Skira, Meghan
Deadbeat Dads
Boston College Working Papers in Economics No. 859, Department of Economics, Boston College, July 2014
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Boston College
Keyword(s): Child Support; Childbearing, Premarital/Nonmarital; Earnings; Fatherhood; Fathers, Absence; Racial Differences

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

Why do some men father children outside of marriage but not provide support? Why are some single women willing to have children outside of marriage when they receive little or no support from unmarried fathers? Why is this behavior especially common among blacks? To shed light on these questions, we develop and estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage, employment, fertility, and child support. We consider the extent to which low earnings and a shortage of single men relative to single women among blacks can explain the prevalence of deadbeat dads and non-marital childbearing. We estimate the model by indirect inference using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. We simulate three distinct counterfactual policy environments: perfect child support enforcement, eliminating the black-white earnings gap, and equalizing black-white population supplies (and therefore gender ratios). We find perfect enforcement reduces non-marital childbearing dramatically, particularly among blacks; over time it translates into many fewer couples living with children from past relationships, and therefore less deadbeat fatherhood. Eliminating the black-white earnings gap reduces the marriage rate difference between blacks and whites by 29 to 43 percent; black child poverty rates fall by nearly 40 percent. Finally equalizing gender ratios has little effect on racial differences in marriage and fertility.
Bibliography Citation
Beauchamp, Andrew, Geoffrey Sanzenbacher, Shannon Seitz and Meghan Skira. "Deadbeat Dads." Boston College Working Papers in Economics No. 859, Department of Economics, Boston College, July 2014.
2. Beauchamp, Andrew
Sanzenbacher, Geoffrey
Seitz, Shannon
Skira, Meghan
Single Moms and Deadbeat Dads: The Role of Earnings, Marriage Market Conditions, and Preference Heterogeneity
International Economic Review 59,1 (February 2018): 191-232.
Also: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12267/abstract
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing, Inc. => Wiley Online
Keyword(s): Child Support; Fathers; Mothers; Parents, Non-Custodial; Parents, Single; Racial Differences

Why do some men father children outside of marriage without providing support? Why do some women have children outside of marriage when they receive little support from fathers? Why is this behavior more common among blacks than whites? We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage, employment, fertility, and child support decisions. We consider the extent to which low earnings, marriage market conditions, and preference heterogeneity explain non-marital childbearing, deadbeat fatherhood, and racial differences in these outcomes. We find the black-white earnings gap and preference heterogeneity explain a substantial portion of racial differences, while marriage market conditions are less important.
Bibliography Citation
Beauchamp, Andrew, Geoffrey Sanzenbacher, Shannon Seitz and Meghan Skira. "Single Moms and Deadbeat Dads: The Role of Earnings, Marriage Market Conditions, and Preference Heterogeneity." International Economic Review 59,1 (February 2018): 191-232.
3. Seitz, Shannon
Accounting for Racial Differences in Marriage and Employment
Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, August 2004.
Also: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/seitz/Paper13.pdf
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Economics Department, Queens University
Keyword(s): Divorce; Household Models; Marriage; Racial Differences

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

To what extent can marriage market conditions explain differences in marriage and employment decisions across blacks and whites? I develop a dynamic, equilibrium model of marriage that is consistent with several stylized facts on racial differences in marriage and employment rates. The parameters of the model are estimated using a panel of young men and women from the US. Black-white differences in the quality and quantity of men and women in the marriage market explain 20% of the difference in marriage rates and between one-fifth and one-third of the differences in employment rates across race.
Bibliography Citation
Seitz, Shannon. "Accounting for Racial Differences in Marriage and Employment." Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, August 2004.
4. Seitz, Shannon
Accounting for Racial Differences in Marriage and Employment
Journal of Labor Economics 27,3 (July 2009): 385-437.
Also: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/599281
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Keyword(s): Earnings; Employment; Marriage; Racial Differences; Wage Gap; Wages

What can account for the differences in marriage and employment decisions across blacks and whites? To answer this question, I develop a dynamic, equilibrium model of marriage. Two explanations for the racial differences in behavior are considered: differences in population supplies and wages. Black‐white differences in population supplies explain one‐fifth of the difference in marriage rates and between one‐fifth and one‐third of the differences in employment rates across race. Removing the racial gap in wages eliminates the differences in employment but increases the differences in marriage rates.
Bibliography Citation
Seitz, Shannon. "Accounting for Racial Differences in Marriage and Employment." Journal of Labor Economics 27,3 (July 2009): 385-437.
5. Seitz, Shannon
Employment and the Sex Ratio in a Two-Sided Model of Marriage
Working Paper, Department of Economics, The University of Western Ontario, April 2000.
Also: http://www.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/ferrall/niepa/papers/seitz.pdf
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Economics Department, Queens University
Keyword(s): Household Models; Income Distribution; Marriage; Sex Ratios; Transfers, Family

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

The implications of changes in the sex ratio for marriage and employment decisions are considered in a dynamic, general equilibrium model of marriage. As a measure of demand and supply conditions in the marriage market, the sex ratio influences the allocation of income within married households and the ease with which single agents contact prospective spouses. The structural parameters of the full two-sided model are estimated using a panel of young men and women from the U.S. Preliminary results indicate the role of the sex ratio on intra-household transfers is negligible; however, the effect of the sex ratio on search frictions for those facing limited marriage market opportunities is substantial. Together, these effects have the potential to account for the dramatic differences in family structure and employment behavior across race and sex in the U.S.
Bibliography Citation
Seitz, Shannon. "Employment and the Sex Ratio in a Two-Sided Model of Marriage." Working Paper, Department of Economics, The University of Western Ontario, April 2000.