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Author: Majumdar, Sumon
Resulting in 2 citations.
1. Majumdar, Sumon
Market Conditions and Worker Training: How Does It Affect and Whom?
Labour Economics 14,1 (January 2007): 1-23.
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Elsevier
Keyword(s): Human Capital; Occupational Choice; Training; Training, On-the-Job; Wage Differentials

This paper analyses the impact of labor market conditions on a firm's incentive to train its workers. In an equilibrium model of the labor market in which firms use both untrained and in-house-trained workers, we show that the incidence of training increases with the tightness of the labor market. In a multi-sector framework, the usual threat of hold-up by a trained worker is more severe for workers who change their sector of work; during downturns, this serves to bias firms' incentives in imparting training away from such workers and towards workers already in the firm and those new workers coming from the same sector. Evidence from the NLSY confirms both predictions--the incidence and duration of company-sponsored training is adversely affected by higher unemployment rates; furthermore, this negative effect is much stronger for workers who change industries as compared to those who do not.
Bibliography Citation
Majumdar, Sumon. "Market Conditions and Worker Training: How Does It Affect and Whom? ." Labour Economics 14,1 (January 2007): 1-23.
2. Majumdar, Sumon
Three Essays on Frictional Labor Markets
Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 2001. DAI, 61, no. 04A (2001): p. 1542
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: UMI - University Microfilms, Bell and Howell Information and Learning
Keyword(s): Labor Market Demographics; Labor Market Segmentation; Labor Market, Secondary; Modeling; Training, On-the-Job; Unemployment; Wage Differentials; Welfare

Labor markets are rarely perfect. Most markets for labor are characterized by frictions and imperfect information so that firms must search for workers and workers must search for firms. This dissertation addresses the effects of specific market frictions on welfare, productivity and unemployment. The first essay uses a nonsequential search model to examine the consequences of labor market frictions for the theory of hedonic wages. Once markets are not perfect, it is shown that wage differentials between jobs with disparate characteristics need not be compensating. Nevertheless, if all workers have identical preferences over these characteristics, the unregulated equilibrium is efficient. When workers differ in their relative preferences for job-characteristics, the labor market may get segmented into good and bad jobs. Further, in this case, certain regulatory constraints on offers made by firms have the potential to benefit all groups. The second essay analyzes the impact of local labor market conditions on firms' incentives to impart costly training to their workers. The formal model demonstrates that the incidence of training should decrease when the market for labor becomes less competitive. However, not all workers are equally likely to be affected. It is shown that during a downturn, firms will be more inclined to train workers coming from their own sector rather than those from other sectors. Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth confirms both predictions of the theoretical model. The pressure of a deadline is encountered in many situations. The third essay sets up a model of multi-dimensional search with a deadline. It examines the sensitivity of behavior to changes in the deadline. In the two-dimensional case, a simple characterization of the optimal search policy is possible, and a wide variety of behaviors can be rationalized as the length of the deadline increases. This characterization is shown to be behaviorally distinct from the traditional case of geometric discounting under an infinite horizon.
Bibliography Citation
Majumdar, Sumon. Three Essays on Frictional Labor Markets. Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 2001. DAI, 61, no. 04A (2001): p. 1542.