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Author: Engelhardt, Bryan
Resulting in 2 citations.
1. Engelhardt, Bryan
The Effect of Employment Frictions on Crime
Journal of Labor Economics 28,3 (July 2010): 677-718.
Also: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651541
Cohort(s): NLSY79, NLSY97
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Keyword(s): Crime; Incarceration/Jail; Job Search; Training, On-the-Job; Unemployment

This article provides estimates on how long it takes for released inmates to find a job and, when they find a job, how less likely they are to be incarcerated. An on-the-job search model with crime is used to model criminal behavior, derive the estimation method, and analyze policies including a job placement program. The results show that the unemployed are incarcerated twice as fast as the employed and take on average 6 months to find a job. The article demonstrates that reducing the average unemployment spell of previously incarcerated criminals by 3 months reduces crime and recidivism by more than 5%.
Bibliography Citation
Engelhardt, Bryan. "The Effect of Employment Frictions on Crime." Journal of Labor Economics 28,3 (July 2010): 677-718.
2. Engelhardt, Bryan
Fuller, David L.
Labor Force Participation and Pair-wise Efficient Contracts with Search and Bargaining
Labour Economics 19,3 (June 2012): 388-402.
Also: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537112000048
Cohort(s): NLSY97
Publisher: Elsevier
Keyword(s): Bargaining Model; Job Search; Labor Force Participation; Wage Models

A “constant” wage is pair-wise inefficient in a standard search model when workers endogenously separate from employment. We derive a pair-wise efficient employment contract that involves workers paying a hiring fee (or bond) upon the formation of a match. We estimate the constant wage and pair-wise efficient contract assuming the hiring fee is unobservable, and find evidence to reject the pair-wise efficient contract in favor of the constant wage rule. A counterfactual experiment reveals the current level of labor force participation to be 9.6% below the efficient level, and a structural shift to the pair-wise efficient contract improves welfare by roughly 3.5%.
Bibliography Citation
Engelhardt, Bryan and David L. Fuller. "Labor Force Participation and Pair-wise Efficient Contracts with Search and Bargaining." Labour Economics 19,3 (June 2012): 388-402.