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Title: Incentive Pay, Information, and Earnings: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
Resulting in 1 citation.
1. Bronars, Stephen G.
Moore, Carol S.
Incentive Pay, Information, and Earnings: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
NLS Discussion Paper No. 95-23, Washington DC: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 1995.
Also: http://stats.bls.gov/ore/abstract/nl/nl950020.htm
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: U.S. Department of Labor
Keyword(s): Benefits, Fringe; Educational Attainment; Job Requirements; Layoffs; Modeling; Quits; Wage Growth

Incentive pay mechanisms, such as piece rates, bonuses, tips, profit sharing and commissions base an employee's pay on her individual productivity and not merely her time input. Incentive pay (IP) is expected to play an important role in mitigating the problems of incomplete and asymmetric information in internal labor markets. The key economic insight of this proposal is that jobs which offer IP have relatively lower costs of monitoring a worker's marginal revenue product or performance. Thus a comparison of IP and time-wage jobs can yield a number of empirical tests of information-based models of the labor market. In this proposal we outline empirical tests of information-based models of discrimination and wage-tenure profiles that rely on comparisons of the earnings and employment histories of workers in IP and time-wage jobs.
Bibliography Citation
Bronars, Stephen G. and Carol S. Moore. "Incentive Pay, Information, and Earnings: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth." NLS Discussion Paper No. 95-23, Washington DC: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 1995.