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Author: Sahin, Aysegul

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1.	Sahin, Aysegul
1.	Incentive Effects of Higher Education Subsidies on Student Effort Staff Reports No. 192, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2004. Also: http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr192.html Cohort(s): NLSY79 Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Keyword(s): College Enrollment; Colleges; Cost-Benefit Studies; Human Capital; Modeling; Tuition Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher. This paper uses a game-theoretic model to analyze the disincentive effects of low-tuition policies on student effort. The model of parent and student responses to tuition subsidies is then calibrated using information from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and the High School and Beyond Sophomore Cohort: 1980-92. I find that although subsidizing tuition increases enrollment rates, it reduces student effort. This follows from the fact that a high-subsidy, low-tuition policy causes an increase in the percentage of less able and less highly motivated college graduates. Additionally--and potentially more important--all students, even the more highly motivated ones, respond to lower tuition levels by decreasing their effort levels. This study adds to the literature on the enrollment effects of low-tuition policies by demonstrating how high-subsidy, low-tuition policies have both disincentive effects on students' study time and adverse effects on human capital accumulation
	Bibliography Citation Sahin, Aysegul. "Incentive Effects of Higher Education Subsidies on Student Effort." Staff Reports No. 192, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2004.

2.	Sahin, Aysegul
2.	Incentive Effects of Social Policies on Education and Labor Markets Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Rochester, 2002. DAI-A 63/03, p. 1051, Sep 2002 Cohort(s): NLSY79 Publisher: UMI - University Microfilms, Bell and Howell Information and Learning Keyword(s): College Enrollment; Higher Education; Modeling, Mixed Effects; Tuition; Unemployment; Unemployment Insurance; Welfare A social policy might have disincentive effects on its beneficiaries in the presence of asymmetric information, This dissertation studies the incentive issues arising from the implementation of certain educational and labor market policies when informational asymmetry is present, In particular, the first chapter deals with higher education subsidies and the second chapter studies unemployment insurance. Chapter 1 analyzes the potential disincentive effects of higher education subsidies on students' performance, A game-theoretical model is employed to analyze the interaction between parents and their child prior to and during the college education, The model is calibrated by using information from the High School and Beyond Sophomore Cohort: 1980-92 and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 data sets, The experiments show that subsidizing tuition increases enrollment rates and graduation rates. Yet, there are two effects lowering student effort, First a low-tuition, high-subsidy strategy causes an increase in the ratio of less able and less highly-motivated students among college graduates. Secondly, all students, even the more highly-motivated ones, respond to lower tuition levels by decreasing their effort levels. Chapter 2 employs a dynamic general equilibrium model to design and evaluate long-term unemployment insurance plans (plans that depend on workers' unemployment history) in economies with and without hidden savings. The simulations show that optimal benefit schemes and welfare implications differ considerably when hidden savings are considered. First of all, the optimal benefit path is not necessarily declining, Secondly, the role of history dependence of unemployment insurance plans is not as important quantitatively as the earlier studies suggest: welfare gains are much lower when hidden savings are considered. Given these results, as well as the fact that long-term unemployment insurance plans are hard to administer in practice, switching to long-term plans may not be a desirable policy.
	Bibliography Citation Sahin, Aysegul. Incentive Effects of Social Policies on Education and Labor Markets. Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Rochester, 2002. DAI-A 63/03, p. 1051, Sep 2002.

3.	Sahin, Aysegul
3.	The Rotten Kid at College: The Incentive Effects of Higher Education Subsidies on Student Achievement Department of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, October 2001. Also: http://www.mgmt.purdue.edu/faculty/asahin/subsidy.pdf Cohort(s): NLSY79 Publisher: Department of Economics, Purdue University Keyword(s): College Education; College Enrollment; Colleges; Education; Educational Costs; Educational Returns; Tuition Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher. Higher education subsidies encourage college enrollment by reducing tuitioncosts. Despite the abundant literature on the enrollment effects of low-tuition policies, little has been done to analyze the disincentive effects of these policies on student performance. I employ a game-theoretical model to analyze how parents and students respond to tuition subsidies. The model is calibrated using information from the High School and Beyond Sophomore Cohort and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 data sets. The experiments imply that subsidizing tuition, while increasing enrollment rates, may considerably reduce students? efforts. First of all, a low-tuition, high-subsidy strategy causes an increase in the ratio of less able and less highly-motivated students among college graduates. Secondly, and more importantly, all students, even the more highly motivated ones, respond to lower tuition levels by decreasing their effort levels. I conclude that high-subsidy, low-tuition policies, indeed, have disincentive effects on students? study time.
	Bibliography Citation Sahin, Aysegul. "The Rotten Kid at College: The Incentive Effects of Higher Education Subsidies on Student Achievement." Department of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, October 2001.

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